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HOME/CHEEKY PINT/The company building America’s u…
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// EPISODE
CHEEKY PINT

The company building America’s uranium supply from scratch

DATE November 3, 2026SOURCE CHEEKY PINTPARTICIPANTS AD NARRATOR, JOHN COLLISON, SCOTT NOLAN
// KEY TAKEAWAYS6 ITEMS
  1. 01The Binding Constraint on Nuclear Isn't Licensing or Reactors, It's Fuel
  2. 02A Legislated Demand Cliff: The Russian Uranium Import Ban (Jan 1, 2028)
  3. 03Fuel Cost Becomes the Dominant Variable as Reactors Shrink
  4. 04Nuclear's Real Problem Was Cost and Cost of Capital, Not Just Fear
  5. 05The Enrichment Ladder: Why HALEU Unlocks the Factory-Built Reactor
  6. 06Cost Advantage Through Clean-Sheet Redesign After Decades of Stasis
In this episode

1. Key Themes

The Binding Constraint on Nuclear Isn't Licensing or Reactors, It's Fuel

Scott Nolan's origin story for General Matter is a bottleneck-discovery story. As a Founders Fund investor in reactor startups, he asked what was hardest for them, expected "licensing," and got a different answer. The question that followed exposed a non-existent US industry: "I asked them, 'What's the hardest thing you have to do?' And they I was like, 'Licensing, obviously.' And they said, 'No, it wasn't licensing. It's actually getting the fuel. We have to get all of our fuel from Russia. It's very hard to import.'" [00:00:44] When he asked why US companies didn't make the fuel, the reply was, "What US companies?" [00:01:25] He later summarized the thesis: "What is the bottleneck? What is the the one thing that could prevent all the reactors from scaling... And it's fuel." [00:57:26]

A Legislated Demand Cliff: The Russian Uranium Import Ban (Jan 1, 2028)

The market is created by regulation with a hard date. Nolan: "In mid-2024, Congress passed a ban on imports of Russian uranium. That ban goes into effect January 1st, 2028. Right now they're still importing under a waiver... all these companies are wondering who's going to produce HALEU." [00:04:43] The gap is large: "We get about a quarter from Russia, still imported, that's going to keep going until 2028, and then the rest from European providers. That's France and then a European consortium called Urenco." [00:03:25] Advanced reactors are targeting first deployments in 2028-29: "all of the advanced reactors are more or less targeting first deployments in '28, '29 commercially and then scaling up from there. So, that's about the right time to be online for the market." [00:26:54]

Fuel Cost Becomes the Dominant Variable as Reactors Shrink

The economics shift as reactors get smaller and cheaper to build. Nolan: "When your satellite costs $1 billion, $100 million for a launch isn't so bad. When it costs $1 million, now you really need to think about it... you have a small reactor, SMR... now you need the fuel. And, in fact, the fuel cost matters proportionately more, to where some of these SMRs, their total LCOE could be 50% fuel cost, with enrichment in some cases." [00:32:21] This is the launch-industry analogy applied to nuclear, and it explains why General Matter targets cost, not just domestic capacity.

Nuclear's Real Problem Was Cost and Cost of Capital, Not Just Fear

Nolan pushes back on the "safety panic killed nuclear" narrative, arguing economics did. "I do think the scaling piece is actually one of the proximate causes. Like we never hit economies of scale, we weren't doing it quickly enough, we never built out the supply chains, the workforces would shift around from project to project." [00:15:28] On Vogtle: "at a time of historically low interest rates, 20% of Vogtle's cost overruns were interest rate overruns, interest payment overruns." [00:16:06] And the 1970s macro backdrop: "how do you finance a huge infrastructure project when your cost of capital is well north of 10%?" [00:16:06] His summary of why public acceptance faded: "It's the cleanest baseload, the safest baseload, not the cheapest baseload, so you have to be the cheapest." [00:18:07]

The Enrichment Ladder: Why HALEU Unlocks the Factory-Built Reactor

Enrichment level determines reactor form factor. Existing light-water reactors use 3-5% enriched fuel and need big cores. Nolan: "If you're going up to 19%, 19.75%, 20%, it unlocks a much smaller core that lets you do a factory-built reactor." [00:02:41] The reason: "you want your fuel to be higher octane... at some point, as it is burned... that enrichment level will drop... If you have a very small core... it will pass through... acceptable power production down to not even being critical more quickly." [00:09:04] The 19.75% number is also a regulatory line: "that's why all of the new SMRs, all the advanced reactor designs, specifically choose HALEU, 19.75%, just under 20, which is the cutoff for different regulation internationally and domestically." [00:25:11]

Cost Advantage Through Clean-Sheet Redesign After Decades of Stasis

Asked how a new entrant beats incumbents on cost, Nolan names a third source beyond scale and simplicity: "there's economies of scale, there's simplicity, and then the third, honestly, is decades of technology improvement that no one's captured. So, the last time anyone... reinvented enrichment, at least if you look at the incumbents, the incumbents being Russia, China, and two European firms that use the same underlying technology, the last time anyone's done a clean-sheet redesign was decades ago." [00:44:55] He adds that "there's no public domain technology in this space since the '50s or '60s." [00:44:55] The company's specific technique will be unveiled "first half of next year." [00:37:20]

Vertical Integration as Execution Strategy: In-House EPC, Tesla-Style

General Matter is building construction capability internally rather than outsourcing. Nolan: "Typically in the nuclear space, people outsource the construction of their facilities. In our case, we copied a, you know, the Tesla playbook of build your own in-house construction EPC team... We have our own GC on the construction side. We have our own procurement and engineering teams internally." [00:55:48] He frames the real challenge as manufacturing: "manufacturing is the thing that relatively few companies in the US have really proven that they can do at scale." [00:57:00]

Non-Dilutive Capital as a Hardware Fundraising Risk Reducer

Responding to the hardware-company capital-intensity problem, Nolan describes using government programs to de-risk the first facility: "we competed for a program that Congress authorized to help address this ban on Russian uranium... We were down-selected under the Biden administration, awarded under the Trump administration earlier this year, for a $900 million award for capacity building, which helps us stand up that first facility and takes a lot of that cost off the table." [00:34:41] Bipartisan continuity (selected under one administration, awarded under the next) is itself a signal of durable political support.

Bipartisan Nuclear Political Alignment and a Shift in Public Mood

Nolan: "Now it's got bipartisan support... the Biden administration wanted to triple nuclear production in the US by 2050. The Trump administration wants to quadruple it." [00:21:57] The safety-and-emissions argument: "nuclear is, by far, the cleanest and safest baseload. It's actually safer than wind power, per terawatt hour... if you look at all downstream CO2 emissions, nuclear is actually the lowest, lower than wind or solar." [00:13:33]

2. Contrarian Perspectives

The NRC Is Not the Villain

The investor and startup consensus is that the NRC is the barrier. Nolan: "The blame is often placed on the NRC. I actually don't think it's deserved. They've been great to work with. Ultimately, they care about two things: safety and security, and then there's an environmental consideration as well." [00:06:13] He relays the SMR company's experience: "It's pretty straightforward. You do the safety analysis. You do the security analysis. You show low environmental impact... It's a lot of paperwork and analysis, but it's doable." [00:06:13] General Matter itself submitted its license application, and he treats the NRC as a manageable counterparty rather than an obstacle.

Nuclear's Decline Was Primarily Economic, Not an Accident-Driven Panic

The classical story blames Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and The China Syndrome. Nolan: "maybe the safety concerns put a slight pause on it, but I think that that is often blamed as the only thing... I think it was probably inevitable anyway when your product is not cost-competitive." [00:17:51] He also points to a market-structure cause: utilities "are more like cost-plus organizations, and they're generally going to outsource the construction of the facility. And so, you end up with this dynamic that was in some ways similar to the launch industry of no very strong economic pressure to reduce price." [00:18:45]

The Real Competitor to Ground-Based Nuclear Is Space-Based Solar, Not Solar-Plus-Batteries

Collison suggested solar plus batteries as nuclear's true competitor. Nolan disagreed with the battery piece and named an unexpected rival: "if you want a data center that's five nines, you need a lot of storage... I'd actually delete one thing, the battery piece, and I would say the competitor for nuclear is actually pure solar, solar in sun-sync orbit for data centers, if we're talking data centers. I do think that that's the one other angle that's pretty smart and could possibly win. If we're talking about power on the ground, I think nuclear still wins." [00:14:47]

Enrichment Isn't a Nuclear-Science Problem

Most people assume an enrichment company is a team of nuclear physicists. Nolan: "The answer is it's actually relatively few. It's very few... in our facility, there's no nuclear reactions, there's not even any chemical reactions. What you have is a separation of a gas." [00:35:38] Scientists are needed "mostly for safety analysis... making sure you don't have those things happen." The hard part, he says, "is not simply doing enrichment, it's doing it in a way that can be scalable and highly cost-competitive." [00:41:39]

AI Power Demand Isn't Driving the Near-Term Business, and Gas Is Fine With Him

Counter to the "AI is driving nuclear" narrative: "has not impacted us specifically... most of the contracting volume that we do is with the existing fleet. It's for low-enriched uranium. It's with the utilities. So, as people think about, 'How are they powering data centers in the next couple of years?'... even if it's all natural gas, that's fine, because in the next few years, most of our demand is from existing fleet utility customers." [00:12:11] The AI thesis is a five-year-out pull toward baseload, not a near-term revenue driver.

3. Companies Identified

General Matter

Advanced uranium enrichment startup led by Scott Nolan, building a new facility in Paducah, Kentucky. Mentioned as the subject. Key facts: started end of 2023; "just over 200 people"; NRC license submitted; $900 million government award; targeting delivery by the end of the decade. Nolan: "we started end of 2023. Today, here we are almost 3 years later. The team is just over 200 people, scaling pretty quickly... The facility that we're building is in Paducah, Kentucky... We just submitted our NRC license last week." [00:25:44] On the mission: "our first mission as a provider is produce HALEU before the end of the decade for all these reactors. Part two is bringing the cost down." [00:04:43]

Antares

Smallest-format advanced reactor company, a likely HALEU customer. Nolan: "smallest would be like Antares. That's going to be more for forward-deployed, military, space, things like that. They have an incredible business, you know, in that market." [00:22:46]

Radiant

Containerized 1 MW reactor developer. Nolan: "Next size up would be Radiant, 1 MW, very good reactor design, containerized, for remote applications primarily and base resilience. Great business there." [00:22:53]

Aalo

Small modular reactor company, potential customer. Nolan: "Then you start getting up into the SMR size, and so you have people like Aalo, or Valar, or even Oklo." [00:23:00]

Valar

Small modular reactor company grouped in the SMR tier. Nolan: "you have people like Aalo, or Valar, or even Oklo." [00:23:00]

Oklo

Advanced reactor company mentioned in both the SMR and larger-format tiers. Nolan: "Then you go bigger... you're looking at, you know, Oklo, X-energy, TerraPower, larger format that can really compete on the grid in the near term." [00:23:00]

X-energy

Advanced reactor developer in the larger-format tier. Nolan: "Oklo, X-energy, TerraPower, larger format that can really compete on the grid in the near term." [00:23:31]

TerraPower

Advanced reactor company in the larger-format tier, same quote [00:23:31]. Nolan notes that "not all of these are using HALEU today. Some might use lower-enrich or LEU+, 6 to 10%, because it's available." [00:23:32]

Westinghouse

Designer of the AP1000 gigawatt-scale light-water reactor. Nolan: "those large reactors, those gigawatt-scale, AP1000s, the Westinghouse design, that cannot run HALEU, but they are looking at uprating and running like LEU+." [00:24:07]

Urenco

European enrichment consortium supplying the US. Nolan: "the rest from European providers. That's France and then a European consortium called Urenco." [00:03:25] Described as one of the "two European firms that use the same underlying technology" among the incumbents. [00:44:55]

SpaceX

Reference point for cost-collapse thinking and Nolan's early career. Nolan: "at the end of the first week or month, I felt pretty high certainty that SpaceX would eventually win, even though it was at most 1/1,000th the size. And it was just because of the speed of execution." [00:50:29]

Anduril

Defense "neoprime" cited as a Founders Fund analogue to General Matter. Nolan: "Trae at Founders Fund was looking for a defense company, couldn't find someone that was taking this holistic approach." [00:47:18]

Founders Fund

Venture firm where Nolan was an investor for 10 years and which backed SpaceX, Anduril, and General Matter. Nolan: "first outside investor at a time when very few others wanted to do it" [00:52:09] (re: SpaceX), and its philosophy: "Founders Fund does not programmatically start companies and it doesn't want to either." [00:52:15]

Tesla

Cited as the model for in-house construction. Nolan: "we copied a, you know, the Tesla playbook of build your own in-house construction EPC team." [00:55:48]

Boeing

Incumbent aerospace prime where Nolan interned; cited as a negative example of cost-plus dynamics. Nolan: "I worked on a military program, it was cost-plus... it felt like more and more people were working on the project, and it just didn't feel like we were going faster." [00:48:34]

ULA / Lockheed Martin

Incumbent aerospace primes raised by Collison as stagnation examples. Collison: "How do you avoid becoming ULA, or Lockheed Martin, or..." [00:48:13] Nolan's reply attributes stagnation to cost-plus structure rather than size.

Stripe Press

Publisher mentioned in the ad read, promoting Built to Grow by Stephanie Friedman and Nomad Letters. [00:29:46]

Danaher

Collison's example of a company that profited from adopting lean manufacturing. Collison: "the success of private equity firms of that time, or you know, early Danaher, were, there were all these US firms that had not embraced lean manufacturing." [00:45:52]

Sierra Club

Mentioned for its internal pro-nuclear faction. Nolan: "There was about half of the Sierra Club that was pro-nuclear. Yeah, very pro-nuclear. And it was divided on this." [00:20:27]

4. People Identified

Scott Nolan

Founder and leader of General Matter; former Founders Fund investor (10 years); early SpaceX engineer (2003-2007). Mentioned as the guest. Quote on his bar for founding: "extremely important, no one doing it, and actually lines up with skills is such a small Venn diagram that the it's almost like that activation energy is so high to go do it, that it has to be extremely compelling, and then most of the risk, I think, ends up being on execution." [00:53:40] Early SpaceX work: "I worked on the engine systems, so the Merlin engine... And then after that, did a series of engines across a few vehicles, including the Dragon capsule." [00:30:43]

Elon Musk

Founder of SpaceX; credited for the cost-of-launch insight. Nolan: "nobody really thought that like space launch was a thing until Elon tried to launch something and realized it was the cost of the launch." [00:47:18] Also associated with the "green lights to Malibu" scheduling philosophy discussed by Collison [00:27:14].

Peter Thiel

Referenced by Nolan as the philosophical influence. Nolan: "It kind of overlaps with Peter's sort of philosophy." [00:31:53] The related prompt is "what important truth do you believe that most of your peers would disagree with you on?" [00:52:15]

Trae Stephens

Founders Fund partner and Anduril co-founder, referred to by first name. Nolan: "Trae at Founders Fund was looking for a defense company, couldn't find someone that was taking this holistic approach." [00:47:18]

Ansel Adams

Photographer tied to the Sierra Club's nuclear rift. Nolan: "Around the time of Ansel Adams taking photos for the Sierra Club... as actually being something that led him that created some huge rift." [00:20:33]

Stephanie Friedman

Author of Built to Grow, the sales-engine playbook promoted in the ad. Mentioned in the ad read: "Built to Grow by Stephanie Friedman, the tactical playbook for building a sales engine from hire number 1 to 100." [00:29:46]

Nick Sleep and Qais Zakaria

Fund managers whose letters are collected in Nomad Letters. Ad read: "fund managers who generated a 900% return in just 13 years, backing the relentless flywheels of companies like Amazon and Costco." [00:29:46]

5. Operating Insights

Use "Green Lights to Malibu" as a Bottleneck-Discovery Tool, Not Just a Schedule

Nolan's interpretation of aggressive scheduling is more nuanced than "go faster." Quote: "The green lights to Malibu is not only like a scheduling tool, it's also a constraints tool of, if we really try and dial this in and remove all buffer, what breaks? And so, what's the thing that's actually the critical path." [00:28:55] Collison named it: "it's a bottleneck discovery tool." Nolan's guardrail against its failure modes: leadership must be "very deep in the weeds on every engineering decision" so that "no one in the room thinks we should do this thing just to shave 1 day... Let's do it right. Let's take 3 days back." [00:29:32] He also flags the management problem: if you hand someone a perfection-based plan, "it's more difficult to judge their performance against that." [00:28:39]

Publish an External Date You Will Hit, Run a Faster Internal One

Nolan separates public commitments from internal targets: "this is one we'll actually hit. So, that's our external timeline... Secret internal timeline is go as fast as we can." [00:27:49] Customer contracts are lined up against the external date, giving the company credibility with buyers while preserving internal urgency.

Site Selection: Weight Community and Talent Above Everything

General Matter's site search ran over a year, "went to over 10 states, looked at over 1,000 plots of land," and landed on the obvious answer: "go to where the community most recently did this." [00:38:33] Nolan: "We always felt like the community was the most important part. We're building a facility that's going to last decades, and so we want to make sure that the community that we're building in actually welcomes us there." [00:38:45] Practical secondary benefit: the DOE site "had been heavily characterized environmentally, and so the environmental work... was quicker than it would have been on a completely uncharacterized, separate piece of land." [00:39:47]

Keep an "Existential" Next Project to Stay Young at Scale

On avoiding corporate sclerosis: "I think the best companies that get large, even like tens of thousands of people, always have that new project, that new thing that's like borderline existential, where if they mess it up, they're going to be in a much worse place than if they never tried it... You have to actually have a vision for the future of what you want this industry to be." [00:48:34]

Set a Three-Part Bar Before Founding

Nolan's filter: "extremely important, no one doing it, and actually lines up with skills." [00:53:40] He applies it as an investor-to-founder test, noting that in both Anduril's and General Matter's cases "there was a long search for someone doing it, because if there was, it wouldn't be worth starting a new company." [00:53:40]

6. Overlooked Insights

Incumbent Enrichment Rests on a Single Underlying Technology Lineage, a Potential Systemic Weak Point

Dropped almost as an aside, Nolan says the incumbents "being Russia, China, and two European firms that use the same underlying technology" have not clean-sheeted the design in decades, and that "there's no public domain technology in this space since the '50s or '60s." [00:44:55] The implication: the global enrichment industry is a near-monoculture, largely unchanged in method and outside American control, and one credible entrant with a novel process could reset the entire cost curve rather than merely add capacity. The fact that General Matter won't reveal its technique until "first half of next year" [00:37:20] makes the technology choice the single biggest unknown and upside variable.

Policy Selection Across Administrations Is a Hidden De-Risking Signal

Nolan mentions in passing that General Matter was "down-selected under the Biden administration, awarded under the Trump administration earlier this year, for a $900 million award." [00:34:49] Few programs survive a party transition intact; this one was chosen by one administration and ratified by the next. Combined with his observation that the Biden administration wanted "to triple nuclear production in the US by 2050" while the Trump administration "wants to quadruple it" [00:21:51], it suggests the Russian-uranium-displacement mandate is among the most politically durable industrial policies in the country, which materially lowers the policy-reversal risk that typically haunts hardware infrastructure startups.